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readers have a problem with paternalism. Parents, and more 
specifically fathers in their traditional role, have acted paternalisti-
cally for ages without thinking such behavior morally suspect. Also, 
many, even those in pluralistic democratic societies, do not seem to 
have a problem with government acting paternalistically, at least in 
some situations. For example, when governments set age limits on 
such activities as smoking tobacco products, drinking alcohol, 
having sex, driving, voting, getting tattooed, buying pornographic 
material, and getting married, many can see the merit in such laws 
even though they do limit parents’ rights to make decision for their 
children. Many in society also see the merits in requiring all 
children of a certain age to attend school, live free from abuse and 
neglect, and not participate in pornography. These are laws 
designed to prevent children suffering from all of the serious and 
potentially fatal harms that such activities can incur. The laws are in 
When we look at Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932/2006), we see that the vast majority of people who live in this world 
(i.e., not the “savages” who live outside of it) do not suffer from 
poverty, disease, hunger, violent crime, fear, or even from unful-
filled desires. The leaders of this world seem to exercise an extreme 
form of paternalism, particularly as it is defined and discussed in 
Michael Merry’s paper, “Paternalism, Obesity, and Tolerable Levels 
of Risk” (2011). The Directors in Huxley’s novel believe that citizens 
cannot be trusted to make decisions that serve their best interests; 
thus the Directors must make the rules for them. When I teach this 
book to my students, they feel sure they wouldn’t want to live in 
Huxley’s world, but they have a hard time defending the right of 
individual liberty over the good of having an entire people live 
without suffering. “Maybe the Directors’ way is the best way to live,” 
they say with frowns and a bad feeling in their guts.
The Problem of Paternalistic  
Solutions to Childhood Obesity
While Huxley’s brave new world shows the horror of living in an 
entirely paternalistic society, it is not necessarily the case that his 
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place and are fairly well accepted presumably because many don’t 
fully trust that all parents will protect and safeguard their children 
from these harms. Merry argues, rightly, that though these laws are 
intended to protect the needs and well- being of society’s children, 
they are nevertheless paternalistic in that they basically say: We 
cannot trust that you (i.e., the parents) will make the best decisions 
for your children, so we must step in and make these decisions for 
you.
In his article, Merry illustrates the difficulty in balancing the 
benefits of paternalistic laws (i.e., they can protect the welfare of 
children) with the harms they can impose (i.e., they can and often do 
limit individual liberty). His analysis of the problem of paternalism, 
particularly in the case of laws aimed at protecting children from the 
health risks of obesity, is important and astute. His suggestions for 
resolving the conflict between safeguarding society’s children and 
avoiding the harm of paternalism, however, lie solely within a 
paternalistic framework. Perhaps what is needed is to step outside of 
paternalism and approach this issue from an alternative viewpoint. 
The question of how we as a society can best deal with the risks of 
obesity while avoiding the harms of paternalism is, therefore, 
examined from a maternalistic framework in the last section of this 
article. The aim in this last section is to offer a fresh perspective on 
the issues Merry raises and present new insights and possible 
solutions that will further Merry’s analysis and inquiry.
Merry’s concern over paternalism from the government is 
that it limits individual liberty. He suggests, “paternalism entails 
interference with the liberty of another for the purposes of 
promoting some good or preventing some harm” (p. 2). Certainly 
such rules and laws as named above interfere with a person’s liberty 
in a certain sense. That is, parents are not free to allow or force their 
children to work on the family farm rather than attend school; they 
are not at liberty to make money by putting their children in a 
pornographic film; they cannot send their children to purchase 
alcohol or cigarettes for them. The government has, in Merry’s 
words, “interfered” with the parents’ decision- making power by 
making certain decisions for them, and most people agree with 
government intrusion in these areas.
But what of obesity? Obesity is an interesting case for a couple 
reasons. One, as Merry points out, it is currently the top concern of 
the World Health Organization. Two, addressing the concerns of 
obesity is, at least in some ways, more complex than addressing 
problems of underage smoking or drinking. Unlike cigarettes and 
alcohol, areas identified as significant health risks to children for 
which governments impose paternalistic rules and regulations, 
children cannot simply not eat, whereas they can completely go 
without cigarettes and alcohol. Banning tobacco and liquor to 
minors is fairly straightforward. And while prohibiting food is 
straightforward, it is an absurd answer to obesity. Yet banning 
unhealthy food, or unhealthy eating habits, is anything but 
clear- cut. How can we be sure that what is healthy for Johnny is 
healthy for Susie, or what is healthy for Maria when she is relatively 
sedentary is healthy for her once she starts gymnastics?
While there are healthy ways to lose weight, there are also 
many unhealthy fad diets being advertised and promoted in the 
media. How can parents and children know which ones to avoid 
and which to follow? While asking one’s doctor for advice is often 
preferable to following the latest diet craze, doctors cannot always 
be relied upon as infallible experts. As Merry states, “attempts to 
prevent harm also entail risk, and those with medical degrees are 
not immune from criticism” (p. 4). Doctors have been known to 
employ what we now believe to be morally reprehensible “treat-
ments,” such as eugenic sterilization, defining homosexuality as a 
psychological illness, and “the banning of children with disabilities 
from school” (p. 4). Relying on experts or the state to determine 
how and what a child eats does not guarantee that the best interests 
of the child are being met. Further, as Merry explains, it requires far 
more intimate and complex intrusions than simply banning a 
particular product (i.e., banning unhealthy food is far more 
complex and intrusive a matter than is banning tobacco and 
alcohol). Thus, Merry’s question about how we can best avoid 
paternalism in public policy while still addressing the very serious 
problem of childhood obesity is a provocative and important one 
because it raises difficult questions about how to best balance the 
protection and promotion of healthy and safe children with the 
liberty of individual choice and family intimacy.
Paternalistic acts are often well- intentioned. However, they 
do, as Merry rightly argues, run the risk of infantilizing and 
diminishing the individual liberty of those whose well- being is in 
question. Merry says that the “moral aim of paternalism is to act on 
behalf of the interests of others who presumably lack sufficient 
information or the resolve to inform and guide their actions” (p. 2). 
This brings to mind Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s short story “The 
Yellow Wallpaper,” in which the husband of the main character acts 
paternalistically when he insists that his wife rest and not strain 
herself by writing (1899/1997). As a doctor, he feels he knows better 
than does his wife what is best for her, and he overrides her own 
belief that she will improve if she is given time to write. Her liberty 
to choose for herself what is in her best interest is taken away by her 
husband who does what he truly feels is best for her, though we as 
readers know he is harming his wife. This is an interesting example 
because it shows how wrongheaded and, indeed, harmful paternal-
ism can be even when the intent is to be kind and beneficial. It 
would be easy to imagine this same physician/husband dictating 
his wife’s or child’s diet in order to avoid obesity; after all, he is the 
husband, the man, the father, and a doctor. Who better to decide 
for his family members what will best promote their health and 
well- being?
The problems arise, Merry points out, when we consider that 
paternalism may incur more risks than would the risks of the 
targeted behavior: “risks to privacy, risks to family intimacy, risks 
to free choices over an individual’s own leisure time, etc.” (p. 4). He 
thinks that determining “how to balance the liberty interests of 
ordinary citizens against what many feel is a public health concern 
is very complex” (p. 2). In cases of obesity which “are not morally 
different from many other cases involving health risk” (p. 4), Merry 
posits, we must attempt to “balance state paternalism against the 
special privileges and relationships parents have with and toward 
their own children” (p. 3). Additionally, Merry argues that we must 
look at the risks state paternalism poses in validating and thereby 
strengthening the stigma attached to obese children. Labeling 
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obese children as being at risk “often carries moralizing baggage 
that contributes to the perceived risk” (p. 3). Children labeled in 
schools as at risk for any reason are too often “recipients of conde-
scending treatment and lowered expectations” (p. 3), and those 
who statistically are most at risk of obesity are poor or belong to 
certain minority groups. Thus, labeling obese children as at risk, 
Merry says, may lead to “targeting the poor generally and specific 
ethnic minorities in particular” (p. TK).
Merry rightly argues that we should pay very close attention to 
all of the risks associated with state paternalism. While we as a 
society may agree that state intervention in promoting the health 
and welfare of children in some cases or with particular health risks 
may be beneficial, Merry urges us to always examine the risks 
associated with acting paternalistically. I would like it to go without 
saying that all risks ought to be examined when taking any course 
of action, particularly those that interfere or disrupt the liberty of 
others; however, it does not go without saying. Too many 
 people— and we must worry most about those in positions of 
power and authority over many others— approach decisions with a 
one- sided view and do not look at all of the risks associated with 
their decisions. Thus, Merry poses a very important question: 
When is paternalism appropriate and when does it carry with it too 
many risks? Put another way, when does paternalism risk more 
than the actions it is trying to avert?
Universal Approaches to Addressing Childhood 
Obesity that Avoid Paternalism
When the risks of acting paternalistically outweigh those incurred 
by the targeted concern, we may need to look at alternative ways of 
addressing that concern. Merry suggests several alternatives to 
state paternalism in addressing the growing problem of child 
obesity. He asks that we consider putting warning labels on 
unhealthy and addictive foods, providing subsidies for nutritious 
and healthy food, taxing junk food, holding advertisers account-
able for promoting unhealthy eating, and providing sound nutri-
tional information to students and parents so they may make more 
informed choices. According to Merry, these are policies and 
practices that can be applied to the general public that address the 
risks of childhood obesity without incurring the risks associated 
with state paternalism.
While I agree that Merry’s alternatives do a lot to limit 
interference with parents and children as well as the intimacy of the 
family, they seem to interfere with the liberty of corporations and 
advertising agencies. To varying degrees, all rules, laws, regula-
tions, and expectations imposed on people, groups, organizations, 
or firms interfere with the liberty of those for whom they are 
targeted. Given that the laws, regulations, and so on are designed to 
promote the health and well- being of people, they are all paternalis-
tic in some sense, according to Merry’s definition. So, the questions 
then become: When do we impose rules, upon whom should the 
rules be imposed, and what sort of rules should they be? Is it more 
acceptable to interfere with the freedom of corporations than that 
of individuals? As small- business owners, my husband and I must 
follow more and more state and federally mandated rules and 
regulations every year, and it’s to the point where it is nearly 
impossible, without having to pay the exorbitant price of a full- time 
lawyer, to even know or keep up with all the new rules. Such 
interference in the liberty of businesses and corporations is indeed 
an interference in my family’s ability to earn a living. Thus, limiting 
the liberty of corporations indirectly limits the freedoms of individ-
ual people. The state steps in and, in effect, says to business owners 
and corporate CEOs that it cannot trust us to look after the welfare 
of our employees so the government must impose rules.
When we operate within a paternalistic framework, as Merry’s 
article does, trying to find universal rules and regulations that look 
out for the health and well- being of citizens, we run into some very 
tricky questions about whose liberty we should protect in any given 
situation, the extent to which we should regulate people’s and 
organizations’ behaviors, and how we should balance the rights of 
people to live in freedom with the rights of people to live healthy 
and protected lives. Merry’s article, being limited to a paternalistic 
view, may not offer a broad enough perspective from which we can 
address these questions. The problem, as Merry argues, is not just 
obesity but paternalistic solutions to obesity. The answer to Merry’s 
concerns, then, may not lie within the standpoint of paternalism. 
Perhaps if we adopt an alternative framework, one that cannot 
impose the dangers of paternalism, we may shed some new light on 
how we can approach the problem of childhood obesity as well as 
other health risks children face, and this may enable us to further 
the important inquiry and analysis Merry begins.
Maternalism as an Alternative Framework
To understand how a maternalistic framework may be useful here, 
it is helpful to look at maternalism as it contrasts with paternalism. 
When we are being paternal, we are taking charge, making deci-
sions for others, and having the attitude that our decisions are 
better than those for whom we are caring because they are not intel-
ligent, informed, caring, or worldly enough to make the best 
decisions for themselves. Maternalism connotes a more nurturing 
approach to addressing a concern or problem. Traditionally, fathers 
were seen as decision makers for the family, mothers as caretakers. 
Traditional fathers’ roles called for fathers to help their children by 
making decisions for them, while mothers helped by trying to get 
their children to feel happy, safe, comforted, and loved. Paternal is 
more authoritative while maternal is more supportive. Of the two, 
then, paternalism is more limiting to the child’s liberty than is 
maternalism; it says to the child: I know what is in your best 
interests better than do you, and therefore you should give over 
your decision making (at least in certain areas) to me. Maternalism 
says to the child: If we work at this together, we can come up with a 
solution that meets all of our needs.
It is this attitude of “I need to step in because I know better 
than you what is best for you” that bothers many of us about 
governmental paternalism, because the government does not 
always know what is best for individuals or organizations, 
regardless of how well- intentioned the state may be. Just as the 
husband does not know what is best for his wife in “The Yellow 
Wallpaper,” having the best intentions and even some expertise 
does not mean that one will make the best decisions for others. 
Yet individuals and corporations also do not always know what is 
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in their own or others’ best interests, nor can they always be 
trusted to act in ways that serve the interests of themselves or 
others. So what is the answer?
Some answers may come from approaching this problem in a 
more maternalistic framework. Susan Dodds (2000) claims that 
the risks of paternalism in the medical community continue to be 
addressed with the altered “image of the doctor- patient relation-
ship from the presumed beneficent paternalism of the doctor, 
acting on the best (medical) interests of the compliant patient, to a 
contract between patient- consumer and doctor- service provider” 
(p. 213). The doctor’s role is no longer one of imposing her will on 
the patients who submissively comply. Rather, the doctor- patient 
relationship is one of mutual respect where the doctor is recog-
nized as an expert in medical affairs and thus qualified to give 
advice, make suggestions, and offer a plan of action, and the patient 
must use the advice and information to make his own choices 
about what is best for him.
Simply having the doctor offer advice, information, and 
suggestions, however, does not necessarily avoid paternalism. As 
McLeod and Sherwin (2000) argue, medical information often-
times is complex and difficult to explain clearly and simply: “Even 
the most independent and self- reliant patient often feels over-
whelmed and is inclined to defer to medical authority when facing 
serious health matters” (p. 267). Thus, a suggestion from a doctor 
may have the effect of a directive rather than merely one among 
several viable options from which the patient may choose. McLeod 
and Sherwin raise very interesting issues regarding liberty and 
oppression. One cannot simply escape the risks of paternalistic 
interference by calling on people in positions of authority and 
power to make suggestions rather than demands or rules. While 
the length of this paper does not allow for a discussion about how 
oppression makes the issue of paternalism far more complex than 
is shown in Merry’s paper, it is worth looking into how caring, as 
defined and explained by Nel Noddings (2002), may provide some 
valuable insights into addressing the issue of paternalistic interfer-
ence even for people who are oppressed in a society.
Noddings’s ethic of care is a relational ethic; it requires that 
there is a caregiver and a carereceiver. This relational notion has 
powerful implications for our purposes here. If we approach the 
issue of childhood obesity with care, we must, by definition, 
recognize the fundamental and dynamic role of the carereceiver as 
part of the solution. One does not help a child in a caring manner if 
one does not first truly listen to the needs, feelings, experiences, and 
goals of the child. A caregiver does not impose her will on a child. 
Rather, a caregiver offers advice and information based on her 
ongoing and developing understanding of the child, not just on her 
own expertise, goals, and beliefs. According to Noddings (2002), 
paternalism need not be a concern if we treat the child with care or 
“attentive love [that] listens, it is moved, it responds, and it monitors 
its own action in light of the response of the cared for” (pp. 136– 137). 
Doctor or parents, then, would not simply tell an obese child what to 
eat; they would instead take the time to identify the needs and 
feelings of the child and then offer the sort of help the child requires 
(and because each child will have different needs and experiences, 
each child will require a unique plan of treatment).
If the state mandates certain diets or treatment plans for obese 
children, such paternalism certainly runs the high risk of interfer-
ing with the liberties of the child and the parents, as Merry points 
out. If we keep caring in mind, the state could require that pediatri-
cians take childhood obesity seriously as a health concern. It could 
also offer informational workshops on healthy eating and nutri-
tion. It is then up to the parent, as well as the physicians, to use the 
information provided by state agencies and other sources to help 
the child only after establishing and maintaining a caring relation 
with the child.
The ethic of care recognizes that humans are social beings, 
interdependent upon one another. Thus, caring does not seek 
liberty through complete independence and self- sufficiency. 
Rather, according to Virginia Held (1993), caring seeks to promote 
“relations of empathy and mutual intersubjectivity” (p. 60). 
Addressing concerns of obesity with children in a caring manner, 
then, avoids paternalism because it includes the children in a 
genuine and loving way in determining what the best approaches 
are to helping them. The children’s liberties are not threatened 
because from a feminist, caring framework, liberty is not defined as 
complete separation and independence from the parent. Childen’s 
liberties are enhanced and nurtured when they are loved, cared for, 
listened to, and understood, and they respond to the care not only 
by participating in the decisions about what is best for them but 
also by caring for themselves and adopting the practices and 
actions necessary to address their problems of obesity.
Merry raises very important concerns about paternalism 
when governments step in to try and protect the health and welfare 
of children. His entire discussion, though, operates within a 
paternalistic framework. Although he offers some interesting and, 
I think, worthy solutions, we may get even further by looking at 
this issue from a more feminist framework. The ethic of care offers 
promising insights into this issue, insights that may lead us even 
further in our understandings of the risks of paternalism and the 
possible ways we may avoid it while looking out for the welfare of 
our children.
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